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Do human rights change in times of terror? Such matters may be judged
in a number of different arenas. How do nations treat their own citizens in
such times? How do nations treat suspected terrorists, or those that aid and
assist terrorists, or those who may be potential sources of information about
terrorist activities? Is it permissible for governments to employ extraordinary
methods, from prolonged detention, assertive investigative techniques,
rendition, torture, disappearances, wiretapping, surveillance, and confiscation
of property? Is compensation due from a nation state to its own citizens who
are harmed by terrorist actions that the state was unable to prevent? Is that
duty attributable to a general concern with the freedom from want? Do the
anti-terrorist actions of a nation state inspire confidence or concern (bordering
on terror) in the citizens of that nation state?
One yardstick for potentially measuring such changes is the Four
Freedoms Speech of President Roosevelt, delivered in 1941 as the horrendous
atrocities of the Second World War were unfolding in Europe and Asia.1 His

Professorof Law, Loyola Chicago School of Law, ashoenl@luc.edu.
1.
The President delivered his Four Freedoms Speech to a joint session of Congress his
statement of the union on January 6, 1941. He was attempting to justify assistance to Great

Gonzaga JournalofInternationalLaw

Vol. 2 1.1

four freedoms: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom from
Want, and Freedom From Fear are a decent, though broad, set of values
against which legal systems may be judged. In particular, freedom of speech,
religion, and freedom from fear are trenchant areas for consideration.
Freedom from Want is seldom considered as a constitutional value, yet it is
certainly a very basic value, a value commented upon by John Locke when
he described property as something that allowed a person to assert his or her
independence.2 This article explores in a preliminary manner some of these
complex questions with particular attention to the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights,3 a court which has rendered scores of
decisions in the last decades about terrorism related matters. When relevant,
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 4 is also discussed.
Although that court primarily deals with economic issues, when doing so it
must often consider matters involving human rights. When possible,
comparisons are attempted to the Constitution of the United States. Some of
the European Court of Human Rights cases are of minor import; others
involve impact on a grand scale.
Freedom from Fear
I.

Rendition of Suspected Terrorists to Facilitate Torture

The sharpest difference between the constitutional system in the United
States and that prevalent in the European states is probably the sharp disparate
treatment of rendition. The European Court of Human Rights decided the
case of Al Nashiri v. Poland in 2014.1 The United States Supreme Court in
2017 held that there could be no civil liability for conduct related to rendition
under its narrow reading of United States Constitutional law and statutory
law.

Britain through Lend-Lease and other measures. Eleven months and a day later, The Republic
of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.
2.

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 141 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,

1947) "[S]upposing the world given as it was to the Children of Men in common, we see how
labor could make Men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses wherein there
could be no doubt of Right, no room for quarrel."
3.
This court sits as a supranational court interpreting the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 213 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter
Convention], for the forty-seven countries that are members of the Council of Europe (including
Russia and Turkey).
4.
This court sits as a supranational court for matters within the competence of the
European Union, currently twenty-eight member states, all of whom are also members of the
Council of Europe.
5.
Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001 -146044.
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The applicant, A1 Nashiri, was detained at the time of the court's hearing
by the United States at the Internment Facility in Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base in Cuba.6 He was suspected of being involved in the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole destroyer on 12 October 2000 and a similar attack on a French oil tanker,
the MV Lindberg, on 6 October 2002.' Al Nashiri was subjected to
"Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" under the United States "High-Value
Detainees Program". 8 Those techniques included wall standing, that had
decades earlier been ruled cruel and inhumane by the European Court of
Human Rights. 9 Al Nashiri was captured in Dubai and turned over to the CIA
in November of 2002.0 He was subsequently transferred to Afghanistan
where he was confined in a camp known as the Salt Pit,l and then transferred
to Bangkok, Thailand where he was confined in the Cat's Eye detention
center. 12 After transfer to another site he was transferred to Poland. 13 After
the interrogation there, he was transferred to Rabat, Morocco and thence to
Guantanamo Naval Base detention center.' 4 At each of these sites he was
subjected to a variety of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, including ten
listed techniques and others, such as using an unloaded pistol to the head! 5
However, Al Nashiri's saga was not yet over, for from Guantanamo Bay he
was transferred to Rabat, Morocco on March 27, 2004, and thence to a secret
detention facility in Bucharest, Romania, and then finally back to
Guantanamo Bay by September 6, 2006.16
After consideration of extensive material, the court proceeded to decide
the merits. It first held that the prolonged investigation by Poland of the
matter failed to meet the requirements of "'prompt', 'thorough' and
'effective' investigation" of an Article 3 complaint. 17 The court went on to
determine that the ill-treatment complained about met the minimum level of

6.
Id. 41.
7.
Id. IM45-46.
8.
See id. 47-48, 53-54. One of the techniques involved sleep deprevation but for no
longer than eleven days at a time. Id. 54.
9.
Id. 54 (referencing Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1978)). The court also found these practices in violation of the Convention. Al Nashiri
at 594.
10.
A] Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 at 83.
11.
Id. 84.
12.

Id.

85

13.
Id. I 87, 91.
14.
Id. 107.
15.
Id. 100. (These techniques include waterboarding, cramped confinement for up to
eighteen hours, confinement in a box with harmless insects inside, facial holds, facial or insult
slaps, and others.).
16.
See id. 108-109.
17.
Id. 499.

14
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severity to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment as prohibited by
Article 3 of the Convention. 8
The court then considered the lawfulness of the detention. First it
considered that the secret detention of terrorist suspects without any legal
safeguards was an essential element of the CIA rendition program, and that
such detention violated Article 5 of the Convention.' 9
The court then considered whether holding the applicant
incommunicado with his family violated Article 8 of the Convention which
protects family and private life. 20 It held that the interference with Al
Nashiri's family and private life amounted to a violation. 2'
The court then considered the availability of an effective remedy to
complain of these violations as required by Article 13 of the Convention. The
Court concluded that there was a violation of this requirement through the
ineffective investigation carried out by Poland as found earlier in its
opinion.22
The court then considered whether the transfer to another jurisdiction
jeopardized the applicant's prospects of having a fair trial. At the time of the
transfer from Poland in 2003, the military tribunals that had been established
by the United States were found "neither independent nor objectively
impartial", as required by Article 6 of the Convention. 23 The court found "in
the light of publicly available information" any terrorist subject would be
tried before a military commission and the procedure before those
commissions raises serious worldwide concerns about the inability to obtain
a fair trial. 24 The court concluded thus that it was impossible to have a fair
trial.
The court then went on to consider whether the transfer of the applicant
violated Article 2 of the Convention in that the death penalty was possible.2 5
It found that at the time Poland transferred the applicant, a trial with a death
penalty sanction was a real possibility violating fundamental human rights as
recognized by the preamble to Protocol 13 of the Convention and as stated
there, "everyone's right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and
that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of the
right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human
beings. 2 6 In an earlier decision, Soering v. United Kingdom, the Court

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id.
515-519.
See id. n 530-532.
Id. 533.
See id. IN 537-540.
See id.
542- 551.
See id. 555.
Id. 568
Id. IN 576-578.
Id. 578 (citing pmbl. Protocol 13 of the Convention, supra note 5).
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prohibited the U.K. from deporting two U.S. citizens accused of murder to
27
the United States because of the "death row phenomenon."
The court awarded 100,000 euros to the applicant even though the
applicant had not requested pecuniary damages, and also ordered Poland to
seek assurances from the United States that the death penalty will not be
28
applied to the applicant.
There is no decision of the United States Supreme Court that directly
addresses the matter of rendition and ill-treatment of terrorist detainees. The
case most on point, Ziglar v. Abassi,29 deals with Muslims who were detained
shortly after the attacks of 9/11. Initially over 700 were arrested and detained
on immigration charges, but that number decreased to 84 aliens who were
deemed eligible for a "hold until cleared policy."30 These 84 individuals were
detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New
York.3 1
In accordance with official Bureau of Prisons policy, detainees were
confined in "tiny cells for over 23 hours a day."'32 Furthermore, the detainees
were subjected to the following:
Lights in the cells were left on 24 hours. Detainees had little opportunity
for exercise or recreation. They were forbidden to keep anything in the cells,
even basic hygiene products such as soap or a toothbrush. When removed
from the cells for any reason, they were shackled and escorted by four guards.
They were denied access to most forms of communication with the outside
world. They were strip searched often - any time they were moved, as well
33
as at random in their cells.
Some of the conditions imposed, however, were not inflicted pursuant to
official policy. 34 The complaint alleged "prison guards engaged in a pattern
of 'physical and verbal abuse.' 35 Additionally, the "[g]uards allegedly
slammed detainees into walls; twisted their arms, wrists and fingers; broke
their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened them with violence;

81, 111 (1989), http://hudoc.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 14038/88 Eur. Ct H.R.
27.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619
28.
Al Nashiri v. Poland, M589, 594.
29.
See Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. __, Nos. 15-1358, 15-1359, and 15-1363, slip op. 1,
3 (June 19, 2017) (Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Hasty v. Iqbal were both consolidated and decided in
the same opinion.) Three justices recused themselves, so a majority of the six participating
justices, by a four-justice majority, rendered the decision with two justices in dissent. See id. at
33.
30.
Id. at3.
31.

Id., at 3-4.

32.

Id., at 4.

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted their religion."36
It was also alleged that the Warden Hasty, allowed the guards to abuse the
detainees. 31 It was also alleged that the Warden referred to the detainees as
terrorists and prevented the use of normal grievance procedures. 38 The
Warden allegedly stayed away from the unit so as not to see the abuse, but it
was maintained that "he was made aware of the abuse via 'inmate complaints,
staff complaints, hunger strikes, and suicide attempts[,]"' and ignored official
39
logs and other records.
The six detainees who brought suit were all eventually released and
4
deported. 1
Suits were brought against the former Attorney General, John Ashcroft,
former head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert Mueller, and the
former head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Commissioner
James Ziglar, (the Executive Officials), and the warden and assistant warden
41
of the detention facility, Dennis Hasty and James Sherman (Wardens).
The suits were brought under a theory that the actions of the Executive
Officials were constitutional torts under the authority of Bivens v. Six
Unnamed Fed. Narcotics Agents.42 The claims of the respondents are as
follows:
First, Respondents alleged that petitioners detained them in harsh pretrial
conditions for a punitive purpose in violation of the substantive due process
component of the Fifth Amendment. Second, respondents alleged that
petitioners detained them in harsh conditions because of their actual or
apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. Third, respondents alleged that the
Wardens subjected them to punitive strip searches unrelated to any legitimate
penological interest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the
substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. Fourth,
respondents alleged that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to abuse
respondents in violation of the substantive due process component of the Fifth
43
Amendment.
The opinion for the court by Justice Kennedy never examined whether
the actions complained of violated the constitutional rights alleged, but
36.

Id.

37.

See id. at 14.

38.
Id. at 23.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 4. (The government had no evidence that any of these six detainees were
actually terrorists- the harms continued until eight months after September 11, 2001 by which
time "the defendants knew the plaintiffs had no connection to terrorism.") Id. at 13 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

41.

Id. at6.

42.
43.

Bivens v. Six Unnamed Fed.Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. __ at 5.
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instead held that no Bivens actions were possible in this case, i.e. that no
constitutional tort remedy was available against the Executive Officials for
the conduct alleged." The basic theory supporting the Court's opinion was
that the application of these constitutional rights to the conduct alleged would
have been an extension of the Bivens remedy into heretofore unrecognized
areas.

45

The dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer disagrees with that conclusion.
In part he stated, "If I may paraphrase Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens:
In wartime as well as in peacetime, 'it is important, in a civilized society, that
the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy
for the most flagrant and patently unjustified, unconstitutional, abuses of
official power.'" 4 6 Earlier in his opinion he stated: "[T]hese claims are wellpleaded, state violations of clearly established law, and fall within the scope
of longstanding Bivens law." 47
Perhaps the most fundamental right of an individual is that of liberty. In
that context, the seizure of suspected terrorists, enemy combatants, and/or
sympathizers, presents issues at the core of human rights.
II. Internment of Suspected Enemy Combatants or Sympathizers
In reaction to the 9/11 airplane attacks, both the United Kingdom and the
United States seized various persons suspected of connections to terrorist
activities. Comparison of the treatment of those two groups of persons seized
provides an interesting contrast. The United States seized individuals and for
many years refused to provide even the most minimal of legal proceedings to
examine whether there existed a justification for the detention. In contrast,
the United Kingdom made legal remedies available, remedies that were tested
by resort to the European Court of Human Rights, and found acceptable. Yet
the United Kingdom was able to continue the detention of most of the persons
detained for a number of years. Not only did the domestic courts of the United
Kingdom condone the detentions, the European Court of Human Rights
examined the legal process and determined that it was adequate under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the conditions of
confinement were subject to scrutiny through domestic remedies in the
United Kingdom. Since the applicants had failed to exhaust these remedies
the ECHR declined to examine the conditions of confinement. In a much
earlier decision by the ECHR, conditions of confinement were examined in
the context of the United Kingdom's difficulties in Northern Ireland.4 8 In that
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id at 29.
See id. at 17-25.
Id. at 3 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410-411 (Harlan, J. concurring in the judgment)).
Id. at 2-3.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
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case, various, specific confinement modalities denominated the five
techniques that were found to be in violation of the European Convention on
49
Human Rights.
Prolonged Detention of Suspected Terrorists
Both the United States and the United Kingdom detained for substantial
periods of time persons alleged to be connected to terrorism. Guantanamo
detainees are well known. In each case litigation that ensued reached the
highest courts.
Eleven individuals brought suit in the United Kingdom regarding their
detention. 0 The claims eventually were heard in the ECHR in the case of A.
and Others v. The United Kingdom.5 These eleven individuals were from a
total of sixteen who had been detained under emergency legislation after the
United Kingdom filed a derogation notice because of the events of September
11,2001.52 None of these individuals were British, and all were supposedly
detained because of suspected links to terrorism.53 The detention was for the
purpose of deporting them pursuant to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001.1' Under the legislation, if any of them agreed to be deported, the
detention would end.5 5 The statute provided for hearings before the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and subsequent appeals on points
of law to the Court of Appeal. 56 Appeals to the House of Lords was also
possible. 7
Obviously, citizens of Britain had little to fear from these actions of the
government, moreover, since relatively few individuals were targeted; thus
the contrast with the actions of the United States is quite sharp.
The ECHR rejected consideration of the cases of two of the detainees,
one because he was deported within three days, the other deported to France
within three months, of the commencement of their detentions.58 The
remaining cases were considered on their merits.
The first issue the SIAC considered was whether the detentions were
justified by the facts of the individual cases.5 9 Such scrutiny was complicated

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 167.
See A. And Others v. United Kingdom, 2009-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 137, 152.

Id.
See id. at 149-152.
Id.at 150.
Id. at 150-151.
See id. at 150.
See id.
See id. at 155.
Id.at 216-17.
See id. at 152.
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because for each of the individuals the files included openly disclosed facts,
and also closed facts. 60 After consideration of both open and closed material,
the SIAC determined that adequate justifications had been made for the
detentions. 6' However the SIAC refused to consider the detentions under the
special legislation because it considered the derogation from some of the
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights invalid. 62 The SIAC
determined that the situation was serious enough to justify derogation since
the threat did threaten the life of the nation, but the derogation could not be
applied since the statute distinguished between nationals and non-nationals
and no derogation was made from the non-discrimination principle of Article
14 of the Convention. 63 Only if the threat came almost exclusively from nonnationals could the statute be valid.64 However, that was patently false in
these circumstances. 65
The SIAC therefore "quashed the derogation
order[... ] and issued a declaration of incompatibility" with respect to part of
the 2001 Act. 66
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with the SIAC. That court
found that the different treatment between nationals and non-nationals was
not contrary to the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 of the
Convention, because "[t]here was a rational connection between the detention
of non-nationals who could not be deported because of fears for their
safety."67
The Law Lords took a different approach. The Law Lords did not find
that the detentions under the 2001 Act fell "within the exception to the general
right of liberty set out in Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention." 68 The Law Lords
did agree that there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation
(one Lord dissenting), 69 but also held that the detention scheme was neither a
proportionate response to the emergency, nor did the detentions rationally
address the problem at hand!7 ° The Law Lords reasoned that evidence
indicated that nearly one-thousand individuals from the U.K. had attended
training camps in Afghanistan in the last five years. 7' Even if the threat were
somewhat less from such persons, the scheme does not apply to U.K.
inhabitants, and to permit a person who poses a specific danger to leave the
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
Id.at 152-53.
Id. at 153.
Id.
See Id.
See Id.
Id.at 154.
Id at 16.
Id. at 155.
See id.
Id. at 157.
Id.
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country to someplace as close as France (as one did) "is hard to reconcile with
a belief in his capacity to inflict serious injury to the people and interests of
this country. '7' The Law Lords also considered that the Act was too broad
73
and thus could apply to individuals not within the scope of the derogation.
The Law Lords also held that the Act was discriminatory and
inconsistent with Article 14 of the Convention (non-discrimination principle)
from which there had been no derogation.7 4 The Law Lords then granted an
order quashing the derogation order and "a declaration under section 4 of the
1998 Act [... .] that section 23 of the 2001 Act was incompatible with Articles
5 § 1 and 14 of the Convention in so far as it was disproportionate and
permitted discriminatory detention of suspected international terrorists."75
Meanwhile the SIAC, on remand from the Court of Appeal, essentially
affirmed its earlier decision regarding the propriety of the detentions and the
76
use of both open and closed evidence (some apparently obtained by torture).
The court of Appeal upheld the convictions, but the House of Lords
unanimously held that the evidence obtained by torture could not be
employed as such evidence had long been believed to be "inherently
unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary standards of humanity and decency
and incompatible with the principles on which courts should administer
justice." 77 All of the appeals were allowed, the convictions were quashed,
78
and the cases remanded to the SIAC.
However, before the December 8, 2005 decisions of the House of Lords,
all the applicants had lodged appeals with the ECHR on January 24, 2005. 7 9
The ECIIR ruled that the cases of all eleven applicants were admissible even
though all the applicants had been discharged from custody by the time of the
decision. 80 The ECHR held that the detention of nine of the applicants did
not fall within the scope of detention for purposes of deportation and thus
violated the right to liberty of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.8" For two of
the applicants, the one deported within three days of detention and the other
deported within three months of detention, this did not apply.82 However, for
the remainder of the applicants, deportation was not possible without fear of
ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 83 Indeed, one of the
72.
73.

Id. (quoting A. v. Secretary of St. for the Home Dep't, (2004) UKHL 56,
Id.

74.

Id. at 158-59.

75.
76.

Id. at 159.
See id.

77.

Id. at 160-61.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
Id.

161.
147.
218.
217.

33).
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detainees was stateless and no State indicated willingness to accept that
84
person.
The ECHR did agree that there was an adequate case presented that
derogation from the right to liberty would be possible. 85 However, in parallel
to the House of Lords, the ECHR held that the instant detentions for the nine
applicants who were detained upwards of three years, were disproportionate
and thus a violation of article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 86 This was unjustifiable
discrimination between nationals and non-nationals. 87
The court then went on to consider the assertions that Article 5 § 4
(speedy determination by a court to determine lawfulness of the detention)
was violated.8 8 The ECHR focused on the relative importance of open
material versus closed material (that was not disclosed to the detainees). 89 It
held that if there was adequate information to support detention in the open
material, and it was sufficiently specific so as to permit the detainee to have
an opportunity to contest the charges, then the determinations to detain were
lawful. 9° However, for two detainees who were accused of transmitting large
amounts of money to terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda, there was no
evidence in the open material indicating why the authorities thought the
money went to such groups, and hence the detainees were unable to
effectively challenge the charges, and thus Article 5 § 4 had been violated. 9
For two other detainees, the open material was of a general nature that the
detainees were members of named extremist groups linked to al-Qaeda. 92
However, evidence of such links was largely found in the closed material;
and thus the detainees could not effectively challenge the allegations.93 For
these two detainees, the court also found a violation of Article 5 § 4.94 In the
court's view, the balance between what was in the open material and the
95
closed material was an essential consideration.
The court then considered claims for monetary compensation for the
detainees. 96 For nine of the detainees it determined to award compensation,

84.
See id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 224.
87.
See id. (The government submitted no evidence that nationals were significantly
more likely to react negatively to detention than foreign Muslims suspected of connections to
al-Qaeda).
88.
See id.at 233.
89.
See Id. at 233-34.
90.
See id. at 234.
91.
See id. at 235.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
See id. at 232-34.
96.
Id. at 240.
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but to limit the amounts to a range of between 1,7000 euros and 3,900 euros
because of the special factors at play in these cases. 97 These factors include:
the lengthy nature of the detentions that occurred in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks by al-Qaeda, the fact that the authorities acted in good faith to protect
the British people from terrorist attacks, and the replacement of this detention
scheme by a series of control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
of 2005, which would possibly have subjected the detainees to some
restrictions on their liberty.98
The Ability of the State to Detain Suspected Terrorists without
Presenting them to a Judge
The ECHR has decided cases that constrain the rights of States to detain
suspected terrorists without bringing them before a court, even detention for
quite brief periods of time. In Saracoglu and others v. Turkey,99 the ECHR
found that detention for eight days without bringing individuals before a
judge violated Article 5 § 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights."'0
The applicants had been taken into custody by police officers of the AntiTerrorism Branch of the Diyarbakir Security Directorate who considered that
they were involved in the activities of the Revolutionary People's Liberation
Party at the university. 01 Eight days later, when they were brought before a
judge for the first time, three individuals were detained on remand, the
remainder were released. 10 2 The ECHR held that, even supposing the
applicants stood accused of serious offenses, it was unnecessary to detain
them for eight days without bringing them before a judge. 10 3

97.
See id. at 241.
98.
See Id.
99.
Saragoglu and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 4489/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 -83619.
100.
Id. I 37-39, see also The Convention, supra note 5, at art. 5 § 3 ("Everyone arrested
or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be...
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned
by guarantees to appear for trial.").
101.
Sarayoglu and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 4489/02 at 5.
102.
Id. I 9-10.
103.
Id.
37-38. The ECHR cited Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No.
11209/84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57449, (holding that
detention for four days and six hours, without judicial control was impermissible.) As of
November 11, 2009, the Brogan decision, itself, had been cited in more than 70 subsequent
opinions by the ECHR; accord,Boke and Another v. Turkey, App. No. 71912/01 Eur. Ct. HR.
62 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-91636, (holding that detention for seven days
to be excessive despite serious activities by detained person). See generally, Allen Shoenberger
Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration of the Anglo-American Case Law
System ofPrecedentinto the Civil Law System, 55 LOY. L. REv 5 (2009) (Citations to precedents
in European jurisprudence are becoming common.).
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The Ability to Try a Terrorist before a Military Court
The ECHR has issued repeated decisions prohibiting the trial of a
civilian before a military court.' 0 Such determinations have been made under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which reads: "In the determination of.. . any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." 105
Indeed, the ECHR held in 2007, that the presence of a military judge on
06
panel who was replaced during the last stage of the proceeding 1
judicial
the
still amounted to a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 107 The ECHR
considered that since guilt had already been determined, the three civilian
judges were only able to decide the re-qualification of the offense
(membership in an illegal organization), and impose the final
sentence.10 8 Two panels of the Istanbul State Security Court had already
acquitted the applicant of the charges against her, and both times the Court of
Cassation quashed the judgment, first in a regular panel, then in a Plenary
Chamber decision. 0 9 The third time the applicant was tried, it was by three
civilian judges, who adhered to the last Court of Cassation's judgment and
"convicted the applicant of membership in an illegal armed organization",
and sentenced the defendant to twelve years and six months
imprisonment."I0 The court stated, "the military judge's replacement by a
civilian judge ...failed to dissipate the applicant's reasonably held concern
about the trial court's independence and impartialityFalse"' Replacing a
military judge only at the last stage of the proceeding distinguished this case
from another case in which "three civilian judges made a full re-examination
of the fact of the case and a re-assessment of the evidence, before ... ] again
' 12
convicting the applicant." "

104.
See Ozel v. Turkey, App. No. 42739/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33-34 (2002) http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60475; see also Ozdemir v. Turkey, App. No. 59659/00 Eur. Ct. H.R.
35-36 (2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60921.
105.
See Convention, supra note 5.
106.
See Kenar v. Turkey, App. No. 67215/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2007), http://hudoc.ech
r.coe.int/eng?i=001-83955.
107.
Id. IM 40-41.
108.
Id. TT 26, 38. It must be noted however, that the final panel of civilian judges
"acquitted the applicant of the charges of throwing a petrol bomb at a lorry and burning down
a cash dispenser belonging to a bank." Id. 26. The court still sentenced the applicant to twelve
years and six months for membership in an illegal organization and "disbarred him from public
service"). Id.
109.
See Id. 12-15, 20-25.
110.
Id. 26. Two years later the applicant was released from prison following a decision
to suspend the execution of his sentence. See id.at 27.
Ill.
Id. T37.
112.
Id. 39 (distinguishing Yasar v. Turkey, App. No. 46412/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72160.)
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In another case, Birdal v. Turkey," 3 the ECHR stated:
It is understandable that the applicant who was prosecuted
in a State Security Court for disseminating propaganda in
support of an armed, illegal organi[z]ation should have been
apprehensive about being tried by a bench which included a
regular army officer and member of the Military Legal
ServiceFalse
[H]e
could
legitimately
fear
that
the... Security Court might allow itself to be unduly
influenced by considerations which had nothing to do with
the nature of the case. In other words, the applicant's fear
as to the State Security Court's lack of independence and
14
impartiality can be regarded as objectively justified. 1
It is quite clear that the ECHR does not consider that military courts are
appropriate to try alleged terrorists.
The Right of Alleged Terrorists to Legal Representation
The European Convention on Human Rights explicitly addresses the
right to legal representation. Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention
provides:"1 5
1. In the determination of... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing ... by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:...
113.
Birdal v. Turkey, App. No. 53047/99 Eur. Ct. HR (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001 -82503.
114.
Id. 30 (citing Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http:/Ihudo
c.echr.coe.int/engi=001-58197. (The ECHR also found a violation of the applicant's right to
freedom of expression under Art. 10 of the Convention. Id. at 39. By the date of the ECHR
decision, the applicant had already served his sentence: consequently the ECHR awarded
C5,000.00 in respect to non-pecuniary damages. Id.
38, 43. Virtually identical language
appears in the decision of Tezcan Uzunhasanoglu v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21 (2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61712, with the only change a substitution of "for aiding
and abetting an illegal organization" for the words "for disseminating propaganda in support of
an armed, illegal organization." The ECHR, however, awarded nothing in the nature of nonpecuniary damages, stating instead that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient
compensation for any non-pecuniary damage, but the court did state that in principle the most
appropriate form of relief would be to ensure a retrial by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Id. M 23, 28.
115.
See Convention, supra note 5.

Human Rights

Fall 2017

(c) to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing...
It should also be noted that in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3, no reference is made
6
instead the word "everyone" is included in each provision. 1
"citizens,"
to
In Tagaq & Others v. Turkey 17, the applicants had been arrested on
suspicion of membership in an illegal armed organization and of organizing
illegal demonstrations on behalf of that organization." 8 The applicants
complained that they were able to meet with their attorneys, "without privacy,
for [five] and [twenty] minutes respectively", and that they, thus, were not
effectively assisted by counsel." 9 The ECHR agreed, stating that the
Convention is not designed to "guarantee ... rights that are theoretical or
illusory but rights that are practical and effective."' 20
In Kehayov v. Bulgaria 121, the ECHR found that the refusal of an
attorney's access to the case file and denial of the ability to represent his client
in one hearing violated Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 122 In particular the
court noted that the reason cited for not allowing the attorney to represent the
defendant, failure to have the case number on the written authorization signed
by the defendant and handed to the court, "was of such a minor nature that it
could not possibly justify... a decision to deprive the applicant of the benefit
of legal representation ..... the judge could have asked the applicant whether
or not the authorization form concerned the case under examination. 123
Access to a lawyer in the initial stages of an investigation is not explicitly
set out in the Convention, but is normally permitted; and such access may be
restricted for good cause. 124 The ECHR stated that the question was "whether
the restriction . . . , in light of the entirety of the proceedings,... deprived the
accused of a fair hearing .
"I The ECHR observed that the applicant was
-.
represented both at trial and appeal by a lawyer, and the statement obtained
by the police during his pre-trial detention "was not the sole basis for his

116.
See id.
117.
See Taga9 v. Turkey, App. No. 71864/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-93446.

118.

Id. 75.

119.
Id. 736.
120.
Id. (citing Brennan v. the United Kingdom., 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 231). The
court awarded E1,500.00 in non-pecuniary damages and also indicated that the most appropriate
redress would be retrial of the applicants should they so request. Tagaq v. Turkey TT 44-45.
121.
See Kehayov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 41035/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/engi=001 -67982.
122.
Id. 887.
123.
Id. 86.
124.
Id. at 52.
125.
Id. at 52.
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conviction.' 1 26 In rendering the decision, the ECHR cited its earlier decision
in Brennan v. UnitedKingdom, a case in which the initial consultation with a
lawyer was delayed by twenty-four hours, and the initial interview with the
lawyer was conducted with a police officer present. 127 In that case, the
justification for the delay was to prevent alerting persons suspected of
involvement in the offense who had not yet been arrested. 128 The ECHR
concluded that the denial of access during this brief period did not infringe
129
the applicant's rights under Article 6 §§ 1 or 3 (c) of the Convention.
Two weeks after London train and bus bombings killed fifty-two persons
and injured hundreds, four persons were arrested for detonating four
additional bombs on three underground trains and a bus. 130 All of these
subsequent bombs were apparently duds. '31 These arrests resulted in a Grand
Chamber decision of the ECHR in Ibrahim v. United Kingdom. 32 The four
defendants included three who were involved in making the devices, and a
fourth individual accused of aiding and abetting the attempt.' 3 The case
squarely presents questions of the right to representation upon questioning,
the ability of the authorities to question without such representation when
immediate public safety concerns are involved, and the eventual use of
statements at trial made by the accused before they received legal
representation. 3 4 The cases presented a stark look at the dilemma of the
police. They were legitimately concerned that additional bombings might be
attempted, and thus were urgently concerned with uncovering any such
efforts.' 35
The police employed a modified caution when they interrogated suspects
as permitted by British law. 136 This caution neither mentions an advocate,
126.
Id. at 57. The court noted that an expert opinion was advanced at trial that the
handwriting on the illegal placard was that of the applicants (although the Criminal Police
laborator expernt opinion failed to confirm that the handwriting was in fact the applicants. See
id. at 15, 23.
127.
Brennan v. the United Kingdom., 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 213.
128.

129.
130.
40351/09
131.

See id. at 222.

Id. at 230.
Ibrahim v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, and
Eur. Ct. H.R.
14-17 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-166680.
See id f 16.

132.
See id. 1. In 2014, a chamber of the court held that the complaints were admissible
but denied relief. See id 8. A reference to a en banc decision then occurred, which resulted in
the decision of 13 September 2016 (seven or eight years after the original complaints were
lodged with the court).
133.
See id.
17-18.
134.
See id. M 234-38.
135.
See Ibrahim v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, and
40351/09 Eur. Ct. H.R.
8-9 (2016) (Hajiyev, J. joint partly dissenting opinion).
136.
Ibrahim v. United Kingdom,
182-184. This is referenced as the "new style caution"
in the opinion. Id. That caution states: "You do not have to say anthing. But it may harm your
defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in Court.
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nor that one can be supplied without charge.' 37 For three of the persons
prosecuted after this modified warning, the jury was permitted to draw
adverse inferences both from what was not said, as well as from the multiple
lies that were told.'38 The jury was instructed that it should give consideration
that no consultation with an advocate had taken place when it evaluated these
matters, but both the trial court and the appellate court sustained the
convictions as properly obtained. 319
The court considered two primary questions: whether it was permissible
to permit questioning under the new style caution, and whether results from
statements so obtained could be admissible against the defendants. 140 On the
matter of the second issue, the court's opinion referenced the decision of the
1984 United States Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles.14 1 In that case, a
"public safety" exception was created to the requirement that a defendant's
statements obtained without a prior "Miranda" warning, and permitting the
use of such statements at trial, as an exception from the normal rule barring
such use. 142 This was seen as independent of the motivations of the individual
officers involved when "reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety.,'
143
The ECHR agreed with this position under its global fairness
consideration. '44
However, the court reached a different conclusion regarding the fourth
defendant. That defendant was not one of the bomb makers, but rather was
accused of aiding after the fact. 145 The police failed to make a lawyer available
to that person after they concluded that he was potentially culpable of an
offense, and also did not adequately warn the suspect. 146 However, unlike the
three other defendants, there was no documentation of a public safety
rationale by the police investigating that individual. 141 Consequently, the

Anything you do say may be given in evidence." Id. 84. This new style caution was authorized
by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Id. "Section 34 of the 1994 Act permits
adverse inferences to be drawn by a jury where a defendant fails to mention during police
questioning any fact relied upon in his defence in subsequent criminal proceedings." Id. 183.
137.
See id. 184.
138.
See id. IM 108, 183, 292.
139.
See id.
126, 183, 292.
140.
See id. IM74, 76-77.
141.
Id. 230 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)).
142.
See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56. (1984)
143.
dat 656.
144.
See Ibrahim v. United Kingdom, 294.
145.
Id. 18.
146.
See id.
139-40, 147-48, 155.
147.
See Ibrahim v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08, and
40351/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 32 (2016), (Sajo, J. joint partly dissenting, partly concurring in
opinion).

Gonzaga Journalof InternationalLaw

Vol. 2 1.1

court found a violation of the suspect's right to remain silent and in restricting
48
his right of access to an attorney. 1
The remedy ordered, however, did not greatly assist that defendant
because the court could not conclude that the conviction had been
wrongful. 149 The court went on to reject any award of damages, although it
did instruct that the applicant could make a submission to the Criminal Cases
Review Commission in the United Kingdom to have the proceedings
reopened.15 ° The court did, however, order an award of 16,000 euros in
costs. , I
The United States case cited by the ECHR was not a case concerning
terrorism, but rather involved an alleged rape, when within minutes of the
incident the police were informed that the perpetrator had just gone into a
supermarket and that he was carrying a gun.'52 The police entered the
supermarket, and when the accused saw them, he ran towards the back of the
store. 53 He was apprehended a short time later, but had no gun. 5 4 Without
cautioning him, the police asked where the gun was.155 He told them where
he put it, and the gun was retrieved. 5 6 In the subsequent prosecution for
criminal possession of the gun, both the weapon and the statement were
suppressed.' 517 The United States Supreme Court held that this suppression of
evidence was improper because of the emergency nature of the situation as a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda requirement. 5 '
Fear of Your Own Government: Overreaction to Terrorism
During World War II, the United States interned thousands of Japanese
persons, both citizens and non-citizens, for fear of an invasion of the west
coast of the United States. That was a clear overreaction, since it became
known years later that the military did not believe such an invasion was
possible. 59 The United States is not alone in overreacting to events that

148.
See id. 311. The court found a violation of Articles §§ 1 and 3(c). Id.
149.
Id. 315.
150.
See id.
151.
Id. N318.
152.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 649 (1984).
153.
Id.
154.
See Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.1d. at 659-60. The statement and the gun were both held admissible despite the New York
court's ruling that evidence of the gun was inadmissible because it was the "illegal [fruit] of a
Miranda violation." Id. at 660.
159.See, e.g., Hanson W. Baldwin, The Myth of Security, 26 FOREIGN AFF. 253, 263 (1948).

Human Rights

Fall 2017

inspire fear. In the case of Finogenov v. Russia,160 the ECHR considered the
violent ending of a hostage event in a Moscow theater by the Chechen
separatist movement. Over 900 hostages were taken and held for days at gunpoint in the theater's auditorium.1 61 The separatists had guns and explosives,
intermixed eighteen suicide bombers with the hostages, and booby trapped
the theater.'6 2
After several of the hostages had been executed, an unknown narcotics
gas was introduced into the theater, putting all inside to sleep, and the theater
was stormed.' 63 All eighteen suicide bombers were shot and most of the
hostages were freed. '14 However, over 102 of the hostages died on the spot as
a result of the operation, and 129 hostages died in all. 165 Many of the scantily
clad hostages were piled face up outside in 1.8 degree weather and apparently
suffocated as a result of their own vomit or tongues. 1 66 Medical treatment
included injections of Nalaxone and "symptomatic therapy" (which included
artificial lung ventilation). 167 The hostages were transported by ambulances
or city buses to hospitals. 168 The Russian government characterized the most
serious cases by the following symptoms:
[D]isorder of the central nervous system; impairment of consciousness,
from torpor to deep coma; loss of tendon, pupillary and corneal reflexes;
central breathing disorder with a frequency of 8-10 times per minute, as well
as [manifestations] of mechanical asphyxia and airway and aspiration
obstruction, [and] glotidospasms. These symptoms were accompanied by
69
cyanosis of the visible parts of the airway mucus, and of the skin.
According to the Russian government, seven of the 656 hostages who
were hospitalized died; three of those deaths resulted from causes unrelated
to the use of the gas. 70
Many of the hostages rescued from the theater were barely clothed, so
some may have simply died from exposure. In the end, Russian authorities
estimated over 730 hostages were rescued alive. 17' A chief emergency doctor
at one of the hospitals testified they were not informed about the gas used in

160.
Finogenov v. Russia, App. Nos 18299/03, 27311/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://hud
oc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 -108231.
161.
Id. 8.
162.

Id.

163.
Id. M22-23.
See id7 22, 24.
164.
165.
Id. f 24.
166.
Id. 25.
167.
Id. 26.
Id.
168.
169.
Id. 27.
170.
Id. 29.
See id. 24 ("The exact number is unknown since, following their release, not all of
171.
the hostages reported to the authorities.").

30

Gonzaga Journal ofInternationalLaw

Vol. 21.1

the rescue operation, "but realized that the victims had been exposed to a
71 2
narcotic gas and so decided to use Nalaxone as an antidote."'
Prosecutors in Moscow opened a criminal investigation, examining the
hostage situation at the theater.'73 A year after beginning their investigation,
prosecutors decided not to pursue further questioning of the planning of the
rescue operation and the conduct of the security forces. 74
1 The exact nature of
the gas was never revealed to the investigators as a state secret (for national
security reasons).7 5 The investigation, however, concluded the hostage
deaths were not directly caused by the unidentified gas, and instead were a
result of a combination of factors, including physical and emotional
76
conditions induced by prolonged captivity, as well as the unidentified gas. 1
Thus, "[a]s a result of the attack, [forty] terrorists were killed, either because
they resisted and fired back at the special-squad officers, or because there was
a real danger that they would activate the explosive devices which they had
planted in the building."' 7 7
A toxicologist specializing in chemical weapons examined the autopsy
report for the son of an applicant to the court. 78 The toxicologist also
reviewed various official reports, including a forensic histological study from
November 2002, and a repeat study report. 7 9 He concluded the reports were
contradictory, and pointed out the three autopsy reports, as well as the
histological reports, all contained similar findings of chronic encephalitis and
chronic meningitis. 18° The toxicologist "said these were very uncommon
diseases, and it was a rare coincidence that three persons attending the same
theatre on the same date suffered from them."'' In his report, the toxicologist
noted there were no deaths for three days during the hostage situation, and
then "scores [of deaths] within minutes" following the release of the gas,
182
strongly implicating the gas in those subsequent deaths and disabilities.
The "multi-factor" findings in the official autopsy report reviewed by the
toxicologist could not, in his opinion, have contributed to the victim's death,
because of an absence of changes in the body that would have been apparent;
indeed, he concluded none of the "multi-factor" findings in the official report

172.
See id. 60.
173.
Id.
30. At the time of its decision, the Court noted Russian authorities had
apparently not concluded their investigation. Id. 103.
174.
See id. 98.
175.
Id. 101.
176.
See id. 99.
177.
Id. 100.
178.
Id. 110.
179.
Id. 112.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id. 114
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would have significantly affected the victim's chances of survival.183 The
toxicologist's report concluded the victim's death was "caused solely by an
overdose of an opiate ...received from an aerosol delivery during the special
84
operation."'1
Another participant in the rescue, an ambulance doctor, stated in an
interview that medical responders were told to give the hostages injections of
Nalaxone, but those hostages who already received the injections were not
marked, and some of them had been given "two or three shots of Nalaxone,
which is a fatal dose."'8 5 The doctor also said the bus drivers, who were
mostly from outside of Moscow, did not know where to go. 6 According to
him, when the first ambulance arrived at one hospital, "there had been nobody
waiting to meet the ambulance team and dispatch the patients to the
appropriate departments."'8 7 One person had been mistakenly identified as
dead. 8
Various individuals, including a member of parliament complaining
directly to the prosecutor's office in charge of the investigation, lodged
criminal complaints about the operation and its aftermath, but all were
rejected by the Russian courts both at the first level and on appeal. 8 9 Civil
complaints were also lodged with various district courts, but each of these
complaints were dismissed, and the dismissals were all affirmed on appeal.' 90
The applicants complained in the ECHR "their relatives had suffered as
a result of the storming conducted by the Russian security forces."' '" The
ECHR examined the claims under Article 2 of the Convention, which deals
192
with the right to life.
Specific charges were made about the use of the gas in the operation.
The applicants contended that the "former chief of the KGB military counterintelligence department, warned in an interview during the siege that the use
of the gas might cause human losses, especially amongst asthmatics and
children.' 1 93 The applicants also referred to the hostage-taking crisis in Peru
in 1997 during which the use of gas was considered. 194 However "[t]he
American authorities answered in the negative because the use of such a gas
would require a simultaneous deployment of 1[,]000 doctors in order to
183,
184,
185.

Id. T 111
Id. 114
Id. T 116

186.

Id.

187.

Id.

188.

Id.

189.
190.
191.

See id.
120-42 (detailing procedural history of various criminal complaints).
See id. TT 145-55 (detailing procedural history of various civil
complaints).
Id. T 165.

192.

See id.

193.
194.

Id. T 171
Id. 172
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provide quick medical assistance to 400 hostages. 195 Since it was not possible
to "organi[z]e such massive medical assistance, the Peruvian authorities
decided not to use the gas."' 196 The applicants also alleged that the press
officer of the crisis cell had said that several of the terrorists had been
arrested.' 97 However, the allegation turned out not to be true, and it is
assumed that the remaining terrorists either fled or were executed after
arrest.198
The ECHR found it "unthinkable that 125 people of different ages and
physical conditions died almost simultaneously and in the same place because
of various pre-existing health problems[,]" particularly since none had died
in the preceding three days of captivity, "despite prolonged food and water
deprivation.' 99 The Court accepted that the authorities probably did not
intend to cause the deaths of hostages or terrorists through the use of the
gas. 2° Nevertheless, the court unanimously concluded that the investigation
was not effective because it "was neither thorough nor independent," which
constituted a breach of the State's obligation under Article 2 of the
Convention. 20 ' The court also held that there was a violation of Article 2 in
the inadequate planning and conduct of the rescue operation. °2 However, the
court found that the decision to storm the theater did not violate Article 2.2o3
The court ordered compensation to sixty-three petitioners in amounts
ranging from 8,800 to 66,000 euros. 2°4 The total non-pecuniary compensation
exceeded 1.2 million euros. 205 The smallest compensation amount was for
loss of a husband; the largest was to a hostage who lost her partner and
daughter. 2 6 By United States standards these awards are modest amounts for
loss of a life, but they are not unusually modest in the jurisprudence of the
ECHR_ Are they enough to account for the fear of government action in such
situations? That is unclear.
The closest analogue to a siege in the United States involved the Branch
Davidian cult. While attempting to enforce a search warrant for alleged sexual
abuse charges and weapons violations, a siege ensued in which four Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents were killed, sixteen injured, and
195.

Id.

196.

Id

197.
198.
199.

Id. 174
Id.
Id. 7/201.

200.
Id. 202.
201.
Id. 282.
202.
Id.7/266.
203.
Id. 226, ("[T]he authorities had every reason to believe that a forced intervention
was the 'lesser evil' in the circumstances.").
204.
See id. (annex).
205.
See id.
206.
See id.
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eighty-two Branch Davidians were killed - seventy-six in the final
conflagration involving the use of tear gas and the destruction of the
compound by fire. 207 Eventually eight Branch Davidians were convicted of
weapons violations, five were convicted of aiding and abetting voluntary
manslaughter, and four were acquitted on all counts. 2 °8 Twelve Branch
Davidians survived the fifty-one day siege. 2 9 None of the civil cases brought
against the authorities were successful, and no case ever reached the Supreme
21
Court on appeal. 1
Freedom of Religion
Relatively few cases regarding freedom of religion and terrorism have
reached the highest courts. However, there have been a few of interest,
including several cases in Europe regarding the wearing of headscarves. One
such case isAsma Bournaousi v. Micropole.1 ' The case came to the European
Court of Justice on reference from the Cour de cassation of France for a
preliminary ruling under the Treaty on European Union and Article 4 § 1 of
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of November 27, 2000, "establishing a general
212
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
Ms. Bougnaoui was discharged from employment when she wore an
Islamic headscarf, which conflicted with the wishes of one of her employer's
customers. 213 The court considered "the right to freedom of conscience and
religion enshrined in Article 10 § 1 of the Charter", which included the right
"to manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. 21 4 The court explained that "it is only in very limited
circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular, to religion may
constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement. '215 "Such a
characteristic may constitute such a requirement only 'by reason of the nature
of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which
207.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney Generalon the Events at Waco,
Texas: The Aftermath of the April 19 Fire (1993), https://www.justice.gov/publications
/waco/report-deputy-attorney-general-events-waco-texas-aftermath-april- I 9-fire.
208.
See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 711 (5th Cir. 1996).
209.
Id. at 710 XXX (need to check above the line to ensure it was 12 that survived)
210.
See Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 591 U.S. 935
(2004).
211.
Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, Judgment (Grand Chamber March 14,
2017).
212.
Id.
1, 3 (The Treaty was "founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.., as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .... "). xxx (maybe more in
parenthetical)
213.
Id.
14, 19.
214.
Id. 29.
215.
Id. 38 (citing recital 23 of Directive 2000/78).
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they are carried out."'' 216 These requirements "cannot, however, cover
subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the employer to take
account of the particular wishes of the customer. ' 217 "[T]he services of that
employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be
considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the
218
meaning of that provision."
The court's opinion was informed by an extensive opinion by Advocate
General Sharpson, delivered on July 13, 2016.219 The nuanced opinion
concluded that the Directive "should be construed so as to recognize that the
interests of the employer's business will constitute a legitimate aim for the
purposes of that provision... [and] [s]uch discrimination is nevertheless
justified only if it is proportionate to that aim. '220 In the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice, which does not permit dissents, the opinion of an
Advocate General is the closest analogue to a dissenting opinion from a
United States court.
Advocate General Sharpston's opinion references a decision of the Cour
d'appel de Saint-Denis-de-la-R6union which found unfair dismissal of an
employee for wearing a headscarf, "which she had worn since the beginning
of her employment and which had not caused any problems with the
customers of the business with whom she was in contact.""2 In contrast, the
opinion referenced decisions of courts in Belgium, Denmark, and
Netherlands, which upheld employers' ability to discharge an employee
because his or her dress conflicted with the commercial image of the
business.222 The Advocate General also pointed to the decision of the ECHR
about wearing a discrete cross223 and also considered whether the practice was
mandatory in the religion (Sikh turban) 224 or optional (headscarf). 225 The
opinion also noted that in certain European jurisdictions, restrictions on
wearing religious apparel may be imposed for health and safety reasons or
hygiene, but there may also "be a justification where the proper functioning
226
of the business so requires.-
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In the United States, no similar case has risen to the level of the United
States Supreme Court. The closest case is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District, in which the Court held that wearing a black arm band to
protest the war in Vietnam was not grounds for suspending a public school
student.227 Most recently, Linda Tisby, a female jail employee, was fired for
wearing a head scarf, and a New Jersey appellate court upheld the firing
because of overriding safety concerns, the potential safety risk, and potential
228
for concealment of contraband.
However, one cannot ignore the travel bans adopted by President Trump
for people from Muslim countries. In Trump v. International Refugee
Assistance Project, the Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunctions in
two cases to the extent that they prevented enforcement of the 90-day or 120day suspension of entry with respect to
foreign nationals who lacked any bona fide relationship with a person or
entity in the United States. 2 9 The cases were based, in part, upon an argument
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was violated in that
the travel bans were concerned not with national security but with antiMuslim bias. 3 0
Freedom of Speech
Free speech flourishes when unimpaired and unregulated. Government
surveillance is anathema to free speech. Thus, government programs that
monitor speech are most pernicious. Both in Europe and in the United States
such programs exist. One program in Germany dates back to the allied
occupation after WWII. The ECHR considered an aspect of a surveillance
program in Klass and Others v. Germany.23 The program was challenged as
a violation of the right to private life, and whether it included adequate
safeguards against abuse. 232 The court concluded after an elaborate analysis
that there were adequate safeguards in general, but noted that the German
Constitutional Court's judgment of December 15, 1970 required that the
subject of surveillance be notified after surveillance has been terminated as
soon as practical without jeopardizing the purpose of the surveillance.233 In
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that way, German citizens are able to scrutinize the conduct of their
government, albeit after the fact when surveillance no longer was occurring.
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court in Clapperv. Amnesty International
USA, 234 prevented such review by finding that attorneys, who claimed they
were representing individuals who were subject to surveillance under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were unable to raise a challenge
to the Act because they had failed to demonstrate that future injury was
certainly impending. 235 The attorneys alleged, inter alia, that they could not
communicate electronically with persons who they were representing, who
were often outside the United States, and thus were required to incur costs to
travel outside the U.S. to confer with their clients. 23 6 The court concluded in
a 5-4 decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing because harm was too
speculative and they voluntarily incurred the travel expenses. 237 Instead of
any examination of the constitutional propriety of the FISA program's
substance in the face of First and Fourth Amendment challenges, the plaintiffs
were barred from court. The contrast between the intense scrutiny of the
German program by the ECHR and the U.S. Supreme Court's bar of the
litigation could not be more sharp.
Conclusion
Our examination of three of the freedoms from President Roosevelt's
Four Freedom Speech (Freedom from Fear, Freedom of Religion, and
Freedom of Speech) in times of terror lead to an uncomfortable set of
comparisons. While religious freedom may be more recognized in the United
States, it is quite unclear that free speech, particularly freedom from
government surveillance, is as protected in the United States. With respect
to freedom from fear, particularly fear of one's own government, the
comparison is more complex. There are no examples of the use of brute force
in the United States against terrorists that compare with the Russian episode
in the theater siege. On the other hand, the United States' treatment of
foreigners detained in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere leave much to be
desired. Recognition of a right to fair trial, with adequate representation by
counsel, have certainly not been given great protection.
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